Latest post of the previous page:
I think that's taking it out of context. It goes on to say:Nick wrote:Alan H wrote:I think you're missing the point that it's all about prohibited grounds/protected characteristics and only about these: they can't discriminate on protected characteristics, but they could refuse to bake the cake with a right-wing message on it because that does not entail discrimination of persons on the grounds of any protected characteristic.animist wrote:I have to say that this does not seem well reasoned to me. It does seem to entail that my example - a socialist who would not produce a cake with a rightwing message - could be penalised, because this baker had not already declared that he would refuse to make products with political messages
I don't think you are right, Alan, because the judgement says this: [my bold]The judge said that even if she had been persuaded that the appellants had not been aware of the respondent’s religious belief and/or political opinion, she would have found that the appellants discriminated against him by treating him less favourably on the grounds of their own religious beliefs and political opinion.
What they may not do is provide a service that only reflects their own political or religious message in relation to sexual orientation. (my emphasis)
Political persuasion is not protected under discrimination legislation: I think this is saying that it would not matter whether the discrimination in relation to sexual orientation was because of the religious beliefs or the political beliefs of the bakers. The reason the bakers had for discriminating is irrelevant (whether political or religious); the fact that they did discriminate - because of the protected characteristic of sexual orientation - is what was unlawful.